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Ariane Sand-Trigo*
Antipersonnel land mines are among the deadliest and most
insidious weapons in the world today: their aim is to maim for life, they
cannot distinguish between the footfall of a soldier and that of a child and
they recognize no cease-fire or end to war. More than 110 million active
mines are scattered in sixty-four countries and the problem is growing
worse at a dramatic rate. In his last report on mine clearance, the United
Nations Secretary-General indicated that for every mine being removed,
another 20 are being laid; furthermore, he estimated that it would cost
about 33 billion dollars to clear the globe of the currently buried land
mines. Although impressive, these figures do not begin to describe the
human suffering these weapons inflict nor can they give an idea of the
profound disruption they cause to families, societies and economies; thus
seriously undermining their effort and ability to recover from war.
In the execution of its humanitarian mandate, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is confronted on a daily basis with the
horrible consequences of the use of land mines. There are two main areas
of activity of the ICRC with regard to this problem: the direct action in
the field which involves the setting up of hospitals, surgical, and
orthopedic centers; and the implementation and the encouragement of the
development of international humanitarian law that not only establishes
rules for the protection of the victims of armed conflict, but also limits
means and methods of warfare.
In the past ten years, ICRC medical teams have treated over
140,000 war wounded of whom about 30,000 were victims of land mines;
in other words, approximately 25 % of all war injuries are caused by land
mines. Out of these 25 %, 58 % are non-combatants, half of them women
and children. These numbers vary a lot from one country to another; a
sad example is Somalia where, at the height of the conflict, 74% of mine
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victims admitted to the ICRC Hargeisa hospital were women and children.
Doctor Robin Coupland, an ICRC war surgeon, who has studied the
problem closely, estimates that up to 50% of mine victims die within
minutes of the blast and all gathered evidence seem to indicate that for
every person who makes it to the hospital, one dies in the field.
The full extent of this tragedy is hard to assess since the total
number of people maimed or killed will probably never be known. Many
are isolated when the accident occurs, some die alone, and even for those
who are lucky enough to make it to a hospital, medical facilities are
usually overworked and have more important priorities than gathering
information. Only recently have medical and relief organizations such as
Handicap International, Save the Children, Physicians for Human Rights,
to name a few, as well as the ICRC, begun collecting systematic data on
mine blast injuries and deaths.
The first phase of helping a landmine victim is the surgical
treatment which should be performed as soon as possible; unfortunately, in
most cases, the transportation time to the hospitals may be days or even
weeks; only about 20% of the patients admitted to ICRC hospitals because
of a mine injury are admitted within six hours of the accident, while it is
estimated that over 15 % travel for more than three days often without
treatment and by any means available.
The suffering of the victims is further enhanced by the lack of
knowledge and training in war surgery since injuries of this severity and
degree of contamination are rarely seen in civilian practice. Moreover,
such patients also need roughly twice as much blood transfusion as those
injured by fragments or bullets, which places additional burdens on the
medical system in screening blood for HIV, hepatitis or other diseases. If
amputation is needed, and according to ICRC hospitals, it is in more than
35% of mine injuries, the way the surgery is performed is extremely
important since it will ultimately determine whether a victim can be
adequately fitted with a prosthetic limb. In this respect, the ICRC medical
division has organized instructional sessions and seminars in various
countries in order to train and educate surgeons in these specific
techniques, particularly with regard to amputation.
Successful surgical treatment does not begin to deal with the
problems of rehabilitation and, later on, integration back into society. The
rehabilitation of a mine victim who has lost a leg or an arm requires a
prosthetic limb, each such prosthesis must be individually fitted, has a
limited life and must be replaced after some years, if not months, in the
case of children. Another problem is that prostheses are expensive items,
for example, a child injured at the age of ten, with a life expectancy of
another 40 to 50 years, will need 25 appliances during his or her lifetime,
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at approximately $125.00 U.S. dollars for a prosthesis; that amounts to
more than $3,000.00. In countries where the average per capita income is
$15.00 to $20.00 per month, it is not surprising that crutches are often all
people can afford. Furthermore, the manufacture and fitting of these
prostheses requires a specialized workshop and trained technicians that are
often not available in affected countries that lack the resources as well as
the expertise.
Many relief organizations have become involved in rehabilitation
along with the ICRC which, in the last fifteen years, fitted over 60,000
amputees with prostheses. In 1994, twenty-four ICRC orthopedic centers
produced over 12,000 artificial limbs and as of June 1995, fourteen
countries were host to Red Cross orthopedic programs. Unfortunately,
demand still outruns supply.
In addition to the physical trauma, the psychological trauma of the
loss of a limb is considerable, especially in children and young adults.
Unemployment, divorce, poor marriage prospects and social isolation are
just some of the problems which will make rehabilitation all the more
difficult. Although several studies have been conducted on the subject, as
to this day, the full social, economic and financial implications in a
country infested by land mines are unknown.
Unlike chemical or biological weapons, land mines have never
been banned by international consensus; their use has merely been
regulated both by customary international humanitarian law and by the
1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
There are two basic rules of international humanitarian law that
apply directly to anti-personnel land mines and that have been reaffirmed,
for example in the 1977 Protocol I addition to the Geneva Conventions:
(1) Parties to a conflict must always distinguish
between civilians and combatants. Civilians may not be
directly attacked, and indiscriminate attacks and the use of
indiscriminate weapons are prohibited;
(2) It is prohibited to use weapons which cause
unnecessary suffering. Therefore, the use of weapons
whose damaging effects are disproportionate to their
military purpose is prohibited.
These rules have become part of customary international law and
thus apply to all States irrespective of their treaty obligations.
The second source is treaty law, which applies only to States party
to specific treaties. The most relevant text is the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Protocol II of this treaty is
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entitled "Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices."
The main provisions of the Protocol are as follows:
(1) Mines may be directed only at military
objectives, indiscriminate use is prohibited and all feasible
precautions must be taken to protect civilians;
(2) Remotely-delivered mines may not be used
unless their location is accurately recorded or they are
fitted with an effective neutralizing mechanism;
(3) Record must be kept of the location of
pre-planned minefields, and the parties to a conflict are
also to keep records on other minefields laid during
hostilities;
(4) At the end of hostilities, the parties are to try to
agree either among themselves or with other States or
organizations to take the necessary measures to clear
minefields.
Since this treaty was the result of various compromises, it contains
serious flaws and major weaknesses among which: (1) it does not apply to
internal armed conflicts, (2) no clear responsibility is assigned for the
removal of mines, (3) it does not prohibit the use of non-detectable mines,
(4) provisions for remotely delivered mines are not strong enough, (5)
provisions on the use of hand-placed mines are too weak, (6) there is no
effective implementation or monitoring mechanism, (7) as of now, only
fifty-five States have become party to the Convention, and (8) the
Convention should be reviewed more often, at least every five years.
In 1993, the French government took the initiative to ask for a
review Conference of the 1980 Convention. This Conference was held in
Vienna from September 25 to October 13, 1995, and has been preceded by
four expert group meetings in Geneva.
This Conference is a unique opportunity to render this Convention
a dynamic and meaningful means of limiting the suffering and destruction
caused by the use of land mines and we all assumed that today, we would
be able to speak of the results of the Vienna Conference; instead, it has
been suspended until January 1996 as it was unable to reach agreement on
amendments on Protocol II.
However, several important gains were made, in particular the
adoption of Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons and provisional
agreements on certain aspects of Protocol II. These include: (1) the
extension of the scope of the landmine restrictions to cover internal as well
as international armed conflicts, (2) the assignment of responsibility for the
clearance of land mines to those who lay them, (3) an increased protection
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from land mines for ICRC, national Red Cross and Red Crescent
personnel and other humanitarian workers, and (4) a requirement that all
minefields be recorded.
A number of other rules were considered but either ran into
deadlock over technical issues or were weakened by the introduction of
exceptions:
(1) A prohibition on the use of antipersonnel mines
which are not detectable; however, no agreement was
possible on specifying a minimum metallic content for
achieving this; and
(2) A prohibition of the use of long-lived
antipersonnel mines except in fenced, marked and guarded
minefields, nevertheless, the present chairman text allows
the continued use of "dumb mines" without fencing "when
direct enemy military action makes it impossible to
comply."
The concern for the ICRC is that even if these measures were to
be adopted at the next meeting, although representing a big progress, they
will probably prove inefficient and difficult to monitor. Furthermore, the
following aspects have to be taken into consideration. Some States
indicated that they would need grace periods up to fifteen years in order to
fit their mines with a minimum metal content (to render them detectable)
and equip them with a self-destructing or neutralizing system. If mines
continue to be sown at the present rate, up to 75 million could be added in
such a period to the existing 110 million.
Because 100 million dumb mines (not fitted with a self-destructing
or neutralizing device) remain in stockpiles, they will probably continue to
be used regardless of the prohibition, especially in the absence of
implementation and verification mechanisms. Self-destructing mines are
more expensive and uncertainty prevails as to their reliability (experts
estimate the failure rate between 5 and 20%). Mapping mines are always
difficult in the context of a conflict (maps can get lost, often there is no
time to accurately record the emplacement, geographic elements interfere
easily). The short life of self-destructing mines may be compensated
through an increased use and there is the added danger that they will be
perceived as less dangerous than the so called dumb-mines. And finally,
the promotion of self-destructing mines legitimizes their use generally.
For the ICRC, the only effective solution to the humanitarian crisis
anti-personnel mines have created is to stigmatize them and to prohibit
their production, use, transfer and stockpiling. Indeed, further restricting
and even banning only the use of antipersonnel land mines will not be
effective without strict measures regarding production and transfer since it
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is precisely the cheapness and easy availability of these weapons that have
largely contributed to the enormous scale of the problem. Moreover, the
low level of pledges at the July 1995 International Meeting on Mine
Clearance, convened by the United Nations' Secretary-General,
demonstrates that international commitments are insufficient to ensure the
rapid removal of land mines already in place.
So far, sixteen countries along with the United Nations
Secretary-General, the European Parliament, and the Organization for
African Unity have joined the ICRC in its call for a total ban. This
solution is simpler, easier to verify, and far more effective.
The ICRC is of the position that any measure adopted by the
Review Conference, short of a total ban, should be evaluated by two
criteria:
One, will they significantly, and in the shortest
time possible, reduce the level of civilian casualties?
Two, do they move towards the goal endorsed by
the 1994 United Nations General Assembly' of the
"eventual elimination of antipersonnel land mines"
During the three-week session of the Review Conference in
Vienna, 36 people were killed and 243 maimed by land mines in
Cambodia alone and about 1,600 people world-wide suffered the same
fate. These appalling statistics illustrate the urgency of dealing effectively
with the landmine crisis.
Remarks by Bruno Zimmermann, Deputy Head, ICRC
Delegation to the U.N.
I would like to take the floor on several aspects raised by
the questions from the audience thereby to some extent
also repeating the presentation made earlier by my
colleague Ms. Sand Trigo, which I support fully.
Indeed, international humanitarian law is not
homogeneous, and one can see various lines of division:
such as whether a specific rule is customary or
treaty-based, at a given time and for a given party or
group of parties. Successive treaties have dealt more or
less with the same subject-matters, with changing scope,
substantive rules, and states party to them; various treaties




fitted with different implementation, supervision, and
review mechanisms.
The regulation of land mines belongs to the law governing
the conduct of hostilities, a domain of international
humanitarian law where it is much more difficult, broadly
speaking, not only to devise rules but also to check on
their correct application than in the domain of protection
of, and assistance to, persons in the power of the enemy.
Whatever the difficulty, these two domains, also called
"Hague Law" and "Geneva Law", have somehow been
merged by the adoption of 1977 Protocols I and II
additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Whether in "Geneva Law" or in "Hague Law", it has
often been possible only to progress one step at a time, and
the process has expanded in decades, and even more than a
century, if one thinks of the development since the 1864
Geneva Convention or the 1868 St. Petersburg
Convention. The ICRC knows this and has learned to use
the necessary realism and patience. This is why, .subject to
some sine qua non conditions regarding the outcome of the
work which Ms. Sand Trigo just described to you, the
ICRC considers that the decision to go on with the Review
Conference next year is better and more promising than if
the participants had decided to stop where they stood
mid-October in Vienna.
But again, the ICRC has the feeling, after years of work
and contacts on this subject matter, that any restrictions
that might be adopted short of a total ban would give no
guarantees for the respect of the aforementioned principles
of the prohibition of indiscriminate effects and of the
prohibition of superfluous injury and unnecessary
suffering. Ms. Sand Trigo explained to you why the ICRC
has reached this conclusion and why, therefore, a set of
new restrictions would be seen as a step towards the total
ban, which remains the ICRC's objective.
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